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Essay 
The New Overcrowding 
JONATHAN SIMON 
American prisons are seriously overcrowded, perhaps more than ever in our 
history. Before the era of mass incarceration, prisoner advocates sought to build 
on progressive penological ideas about the proper standards for housing 
prisoners, which focused on one person to each prison cell to create a 
jurisprudence of overcrowding that might compel states to reduce their reliance 
on incarceration. The goal failed, and states adopted tough new sentencing laws 
that increased imprisonment. As the prison book got under way, the Supreme 
Court decisively rejected the one person to a cell rule in the 1981 case of Rhodes 
v. Chapman. This Essay returns to this failed jurisprudence to argue that it has 
been outdated by a fundamental transformation in the nature of prison 
overcrowding. Before mass incarceration, overcrowding was primarily a product 
of antiquated prisons and the reluctance of states to pay for new modern facilities 
to better fit the then dominant rehabilitative objectives. While overcrowding was a 
problem, states had effective tools to deal with it, especially parole laws that 
allowed centralized administrative boards to control the pace of prison releases. 
Mass incarceration has created a new type of overcrowding, one that is far more 
severe and enduring than in the past. This new chronic hyper overcrowding plays 
out in a context where prisoners serve much longer sentences, have less access to 
rehabilitative programs, and greater unmet needs for medical and mental health 
treatment. The old overcrowding led to conflicts and riots. The new overcrowding 
leads to inhumane treatment and sometimes tortuous suffering on a routine basis. 
With states having eliminated parole mechanisms for the majority of prisoners, the 
time is ripe for the courts to recognize that the new overcrowding has rendered 
past precedents out of date and invalid. We need a new jurisprudence of 
overcrowding; one that recognizes the need for a hard constitutional limit, like 
one prisoner to one cell. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Plata 
suggests that the Court is now aware of the magnitude of the problem and lower 
courts have begun to test the applicability of a strengthened overcrowding norm 
more appropriate to the age of mass incarceration.   
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The New Overcrowding 
JONATHAN SIMON* 
I. INTRODUCTION: HYPER-CHRONIC 
OVERCROWDING AS A NEW PENOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
As Jeff Bleich pointed out in an insightful comment written at the 
beginnings of mass incarceration in California, there is something funny 
about the concept of “overcrowding”:  
The term “overcrowding” is redundant at best, since 
crowding already refers to a higher level of social density 
than is desired. At worst, the term begs one of the central 
questions posed by this Comment—namely, at what point 
does a prison’s population become so great that the risks to 
prisoners’ health and safety outweigh society’s demand that 
the prisoners be punished, or that the prisons simply become 
administratively unmanageable.1  
Bleich goes on to an important critique of the way prisoner-advocates, 
prisons, and courts were using overcrowding at that time. Prisoners and 
their advocates were using overcrowding to attack a range of actual 
features of incarceration (including, one might add, imprisonment itself).2 
Prison managers were often eager to use court-mandated reforms to 
achieve their own agenda for investments in the prison.3 Bleich worried 
that due to these institutional incentives, overcrowding jurisprudence might 
lead to a paradoxical situation—one where more success by prisoners in 
establishing constitutional violations on overcrowding grounds might lead 
to more imprisonment, and where the underlying problems facing prisoners 
remain unsolved.4 Some scholars of punishment now believe that this is 
                                                                                                                          
* Adrian A. Kragen Professor of Law, UC Berkeley; Faculty Director, Center for the Study of 
Law & Society. 
1 See Jeff Bleich, Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1125 n.2 
(1989). 
2 See id. at 1127 (“[P]risoners embrace the perception of crowding as an opportunity to reduce 
their sentences. Prisoners’ rights advocates depend upon crowding to get into courts to pursue other 
improvements in prison conditions.”). 
3 See id. (“Prison administrators, prison employees, and legislators advocating the current prison 
building program benefit institutionally from the perception of crowding. Prison administrators benefit 
because this perception supports their demands for more personnel, larger budgets, and stricter controls 
over prisoners, and because it permits them to escape blame for prison disturbances.”). 
4 See id. at 1128 (“[B]ecause the debate now focuses on crowding, the term may be used in place 
of or even to mask other serious defects in the prison system. Prison managers may be 
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part of the dynamic that led to mass incarceration in states under court 
orders, where prisoner lawsuits forced fiscally conservative state 
legislatures to increase investment in the prison just as other political 
forces aligned to make increasing imprisonment a popular political 
position.5 
This Essay returns to the failures of overcrowding jurisprudence in the 
period leading up to mass incarceration, but from the perspective of a new 
overcrowding that has come to characterize many American prisons in the 
era of mass incarceration. The old overcrowding was rooted in the 
antiquity of most state prisons as these populations began to grow in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.6 Some states keen on advancing new hopes for 
a rehabilitative penology had built new prisons in the 1950s and 1960s that 
were typically targeted at the most promising prisoners; these smaller and 
more specialized prisons added little to the state’s overall prison capacity.7 
To handle the great majority of their prisoners, almost all states in the 
1970s relied on one or more prisons built during the last great prison boom 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8 These prisons, dubbed 
“Big Houses” after the facades of some of the more influential nineteenth 
century ones (a term then immortalized by Hollywood in the twentieth 
century), were generally large and organized around tightly stacked tiers of 
cells.9 These prisons typically suffered from significant problems in 
heating and cooling, inadequate plumbing, and contained little space for 
                                                                                                                          
misdiagnosing—or intentionally misstating—the sources of current prison problems because of the 
ease of attributing difficulties to crowding. Accordingly, many of the programs currently funded by 
legislatures to combat crowding may be unsuccessful because they are ill-suited to the true underlying 
problems.”). 
5 See MONA LYNCH, SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
PUNISHMENT 1–2 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2010) (“[A] mere 25 years after what looked like the demise, 
or at least the diminution of incarceration, the national imprisonment rate had nearly quintupled to 410 
prisoners per 100,000 population.”); Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of 
Prison Conditions Litigation, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 731, 731–32 (2010) (discussing increased 
incarceration rates during and after the 1970s).  
6 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1129–30 (“In absolute numbers, the nation’s incarcerated population 
is at an all-time high; there are almost 630,000 people in state and federal prisons—more than three 
times as many as in 1970. As of 1985, there were 150,000 more prisoners than America’s prisons were 
designed to accommodate.”).  
7 See Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and 
Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33, 36 (2011) (discussing the prevalence of the 
rehabilitative ideal in the 1950s and its decline in the 1970s). 
8 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1145 (describing the relationship between rising prison populations 
and prison construction rates). 
9 See Stefanie Evans, Comment, Making More Effective Use of Our Prisons Through Regimented 
Labor, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 521, 523 (2000) (“In the 1950s, the ‘Big House’ dominated the prison scene. 
The typical Big House prison consisted of many large cell blocks on multiple tiers, and on average it 
held 2,500 men.”). 
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accommodating more prisoners after double celling.10  
While overcrowding was a problem in some states before the 
beginnings of mass incarceration, most states had a significant tool to 
combat it: parole. State sentencing laws typically allowed for the early 
release of prisoners well before the end of their judicially imposed 
sentences.11 In theory, parole boards were supposed to consider early 
release (as well as the parallel question of when parolees—released 
prisoners under supervision in the community—who have violated the 
conditions of parole should be returned to prison) only in terms of how 
much risk the person posed to public safety.12 However, prison experts 
have long believed that these boards used their discretion to manage state 
prison populations and head off the internal tensions and riots that 
overcrowding could lead to.13  
In the era of mass incarceration, a new kind of overcrowding has 
emerged that I call “hyper-chronic” overcrowding.14 It is “hyper” in the 
sense that it is “extreme.” Before mass incarceration, prison experts 
considered anything above 90% of the design capacity to be 
overcrowded.15 During mass incarceration, the most overcrowded states 
operated at well above 120% of capacity.16 California, the locus of the 
landmark case Brown v. Plata,17 had long operated at nearly 200% of 
design capacity at the time the court order authorizing relief of 
                                                                                                                          
10 James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the 
Supreme Court, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (1997) (“The Big House was a walled prison with large 
cell blocks that contained stacks of three or more tiers of one-or-two-man cells. On the average, it held 
2,500 men. Sometimes a single cell block housed over 1,000 prisoners in six tiers of cells. . . . 
Overall . . . cell blocks were harsh worlds of steel and concrete, of unbearable heat and stench in the 
summer and chilling cold in the winter, of cramped quarters, and of constant droning, shouting, and 
clanking noise.”); Evans, supra note 9, at 523 (describing the poor living and sanitary conditions inside 
“Big House” prisons). 
11 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1147 (“Prior to 1970, prison administrators were better able to 
adjust prison populations through flexible parole criteria. As prison populations increased, parole 
boards frequently advanced parole dates or took slightly greater risks with parole candidates in order to 
ease the burden on a prison.”). 
12 Sheldon L. Messinger et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
69, 81–84 (1985) (providing the original intentions of parole programs). 
13 See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 7, at 36 (“[T]here was a growing consensus that the indeterminate 
mode of sentencing (whereby inmates were released by parole boards that ostensibly decided whether 
an inmate was ‘rehabilitated’) was an unacceptable model, with critics on the left focusing on the racial 
disparities produced by the system and commentators on the right complaining about ‘liberal’ judges 
and parole boards ‘coddling’ offenders.”). 
14 JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND 
THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 110 (2014).  
15 Bleich, supra note 1, at 1142 n.80.  
16 See, e.g., Pamela M. Rosenblatt, The Dilemma of Overcrowding in the Nation’s Prisons: What 
Are Constitutional Conditions and What Can Be Done?, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 489, 489–90, 490 
nn.6–7 (1990) (discussing the history of mass incarceration overcrowding).  
17 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).  
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overcrowding was upheld and entered.18 “Chronic” means something that 
is enduring or occurring again and again.19 Before mass incarceration, 
overcrowding was episodic, partially because it was tied to crime waves or 
other sources of episodic increases in law enforcement or severity.20 One 
expects that a number of important social and political forces (e.g., racial 
tensions and strikes) influenced imprisonment rates even within the largely 
steady pattern that persisted before mass incarceration. Overcrowding 
under mass incarceration is enduring and it arises from structural features 
of the sentencing and criminal justice systems that are relatively 
independent of crime and other social factors. In California, for example, 
despite building twenty-two new prisons, overcrowding was present 
throughout the growth and stabilization of mass incarceration, and stayed 
at or near 200% of capacity system-wide for well over a decade, until 
forced by the courts to reduce to 137% of design capacity, a level reached 
only this past spring.21 However, even this accomplishment was achieved 
only by keeping some ten thousand prisoners either in county jails or 
private prisons out of state (both at great expense). Moreover, California 
Governor Jerry Brown has expressed concern that overcrowding could rise 
again without further changes in sentencing laws.22  
Hyper-chronic overcrowding presents a very different problem for 
prisoners and prison workers than the old overcrowding, and it lends itself 
to a very different kind of organizational adaptation. The old overcrowding 
                                                                                                                          
18 Id. at 1923–24.  
19 See, e.g., Chronic, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/chronic [https://perma.cc/KH3R-G82M] (defining this term as meaning, among 
other things, “continuing or occurring again and again for a long time”).  
20 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1144–46 (describing the historical flux in prison crowding). 
21 After several extensions California reached the level in the spring of 2015, prior to the 
December final deadline, thanks to (1) legislative changes introduced in 2011 known as Correctional 
Realignment that diverted non-serious, non-sexual, and non-violent felons from state prison, Bob 
Egelko, Crime Down, Costs Up Since Prison Realignment, Study Finds, S.F. GATE (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Crime-down-costs-up-since-prison-realignment-6536236.php#pho 
to-3198399 [https://perma.cc/SX8J-LF9B], and (2) Proposition 47, a 2014 ballot initiative that freed 
some existing prisoners by allowing their felony convictions for non-violent drug and property crimes 
to be reduced to misdemeanors, Melody Gutierrez, California Prisons Have Released 2,700 Inmates 
Under Prop. 47, S.F. GATE (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/California-prisons-
have-released-2-700-inmates-6117826.php [https://perma.cc/CD6Y-PLXD]. 
22 Governor Jerry Brown expressed this concern in a conference call with reporters announcing 
his support for a ballot initiative that would allow parole release consideration for people in prison for 
non-violent felony convictions. See John Myers, Gov. Brown to Seek November Ballot Initiative to 
Relax Mandatory Prison Sentences, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-
pol-sac-jerry-brown-sentencing-reform-ballot-20160127-story.html [https://perma.cc/K88A-9EFQ] 
(discussing Governor Brown’s proposals concerning a referendum aimed at rehabilitation and reducing 
California’s prison population).  
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led to discomfort, conflicts, and the risk of riots.23 The new overcrowding 
leads to a routine lack of medical care and mental health care, leading to 
higher levels of suicide, death, and instances of extreme pain amounting to 
torture––conditions which were the driving considerations in Brown v. 
Plata.24 Prisons responded to the old overcrowding internally with a 
combination of discipline and restraint, and at the system level by using 
parole mechanisms to reduce the population over time.25 Prisons in 
California have responded to the new overcrowding by relying on a race-
based gang classification system to establish internal mechanisms for 
conflict and conflict resolution among prisoners, and also through 
lockdowns, cell extractions, and other forms of emergency style 
management.26  
In retrospect, the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Rhodes v. 
Chapman27 was a fateful bridge on the road (or if you will, with poetic 
license, the Rhodes) to mass incarceration. Lower courts had been citing 
overcrowding as a ground for finding constitutional violations, but there 
was no clear Eighth Amendment standard for overcrowding. Given the 
coalescence of many prison experts and the American Correctional 
Association’s accreditation standards around a one prisoner for one cell 
standard, many prison advocates hoped the Supreme Court would establish 
such a standard.28 Already, in Bell v. Wolfish,29 the Court had suggested 
that it saw no “one man, one cell principle lurking in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”30 In Rhodes, the Court faced the issue 
squarely in the context of a new prison built as part of the pre-mass 
incarceration effort to expand rehabilitative penology, but which had 
gradually become overcrowded as incarceration rates began to rise in the 
late 1970s.31 The Court rejected an overcrowding doctrine based on the one 
person to a cell standard, pointedly noting that there was no constitutional 
right to “comfortable prisons.”32  
                                                                                                                          
23 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1132–37 (describing the dangers which obtained in overcrowded 
prisons in 1989, including inmate violence, inmate health, and the overtaxing effect on prison 
management).  
24 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).  
25 See Bleich, supra note 1, at 1147–49, 1159–60 (describing the strategies used to manage or 
reduce prison crowding).  
26 Second Amended Complaint, Mitchell v. Cate, No. 2:08-cv-01196-RAJ (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2011). 
27 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
28 See Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (stating that the “[ACA] 
Manual provides that in a detention facility there should be one inmate per room or cell”). 
29 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The case dealt with pretrial detainees and thus relies on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, but for prison conditions the 
analysis is essentially the same. 
30 Id. at 542.  
31 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339, 340–42.  
32 Id. at 349.  
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Had Rhodes come out the other way, mass incarceration would likely 
not have happened. With an Eighth Amendment requirement to achieve 
one prisoner to a cell, the escalation of people being sent to prison and the 
lengthiness of sentences would have been stopped in its tracks by a hard 
constitutional line that states could never have afforded to overtake through 
prison building, and the Supreme Court would have been reluctant to 
reverse. Instead, Rhodes gave the green light to sustain overcrowding by 
state prison systems, and helped assure that prison condition lawsuits, 
where successful, would drive a process of prison expansion that would 
lead to an ever-growing prison population, along with enduring 
overcrowding. 
However, the Supreme Court’s recognition of the new overcrowding in 
Brown may signal a new opportunity for judicial development of 
overcrowding as a distinct Eighth Amendment doctrine. The long-term 
goal should be to reduce Rhodes to its facts on the grounds that it no longer 
makes sense to apply it to a new kind of prison system and a new kind of 
overcrowding. In the meantime, lower courts can use this gap to craft 
meaningful limits on overcrowding, and even establish a “one person per 
cell” rule without waiting. 
II. THE OLD OVERCROWDING 
Prison overcrowding is almost repetitive as a term. In the history of 
prisons, they have rarely operated below their design capacity,33 which 
may suggest that the size of the prison estate establishes, in effect, a 
minimum size of the prison population. Overcrowding as a social problem 
has largely been concerned with prisons, or with housing for the poor (i.e., 
prisons are another form of housing for the poor). For much of its history, 
prison overcrowding has been primarily a function of the extremely high 
capital costs of building new prisons, which makes the marginal cost of the 
last prisoners stuffed into the old prison dramatically lower than that for 
the first prisoner placed in the new prison. As pressure built on prison 
overcrowding at the end of the nineteenth century, most states adopted 
laws permitting early release (known as parole, from the shortening of the 
French phrase for “word of honor,” a ritual by which military prisoners 
were traditionally allowed to leave confinement on the promise not to 
return to the field of battle).34 In theory, parole was supposed to be based 
on an administrative judgment that the prisoner had been effectively 
rehabilitated and, with proper aftercare (parole supervision which was 
invented at the same time), could return to the community with little risk of 
                                                                                                                          
33 Claudia Angelos & James B. Jacobs, Prison Overcrowding and the Law, 478 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 100, 101 (1985).  
34 Paul J. Larkin Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 306–08 (2013).  
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further criminal behavior.35 While imperfect, there is little doubt that 
parole allowed prison managers to regulate the level of overcrowding. 
Perhaps because of this, overcrowding was never defined as a distinct 
Eighth Amendment issue during the most active period of prison condition 
lawsuits between 1960 and 1990.36 
A.  The Old Penal Estate 
On the eve of mass incarceration—the decade of the 1970s—the prison 
“system” (a term only applicable to the largest prisons at the time) in most 
states consisted of one or two penitentiaries—older prisons built typically 
in the nineteenth century and expanded during the crime wave of the 
1920s.37 These “Big House” style prisons typically consisted of stacked 
tiers of cells.38 In the most reform-oriented and richest states, like 
California, Illinois, and New York, the 1950s saw development of a new 
generation of rehabilitation-oriented prisons, typically aimed at younger, 
more “treatable” people convicted of felonies.39 These smaller prisons 
experimented with dormitory-style rooms in place of cells, combined with 
plentiful space for examining, training, educating, and treating inmates. 
Throughout the 1960s, rising crime rates40 likely led to a natural 
increase in prison overcrowding (although data is not easily available for 
this period). Most of this would have been concentrated in the Big House 
style prisons, with the newer, smaller prisons protected as much as 
possible. But Big House prisons, with their cellular design based on 
solitary confinement at night41 (from the New York or “Auburn” model 
                                                                                                                          
35 Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 284–85 (1972). 
36 See Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 102–07 (explaining that through the 1970s and 1980s 
overcrowding of prisons was “not viewed as unconstitutional per se”—rather, courts had to determine 
if “crowding has caused deprivation of basic human needs before they can order relief”).  
37 See Rosalind K. Kelley, Comment, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovation in 
Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 763 (1989) (noting the rise in the use of 
the penitentiary system “during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries . . . , which became the primary 
goal of punishment in the early 1900s”). 
38 Evans, supra note 9, at 523.  
39 See LYNCH, supra note 5, at 2 (“[D]uring the 1970s, faith in the rehabilitative ideal that had 
prevailed in penology for the past century began to erode among criminal justice practitioners, 
academics, and policymakers.”). For one of the most ambitious such efforts in California, see ELLIOT 
STUDT ET AL., C-UNIT: SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY IN PRISON 56 (1968) (describing rooms with 
windows and doors rather than bars at Deuel Vocational institution, which was designed for younger 
prisoners). 
40 See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in 
the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1032–34 (2010) (recounting several of the reasons for the 
rise of crime rates of the 1960s). 
41 On the design of the Big House style prison, see REBECCA MCLENNON, THE CRISIS OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, 
at 56 (2008) (“[C]ellular incarceration . . . of the convicts by night and their impressment into silent, 
congregate labor . . . by day”). 
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that had won out over its full-time solitary confinement competitor in 
Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century),42 set some hard limits on 
overcrowding. One might have been able to place two prisoners in those 
cells, but any more than two was hard to configure, let alone manage 
without riots. More importantly, these prisons lacked flexible space in 
which more prisoners could be held. Indeed, the original Auburn style 
prisons had mainly cell tiers and factory-style spaces.43 Removing the 
(increasingly archaic) industrial equipment and putting in bunk beds would 
have been a possibility to create more space, but that would have required 
completely abandoning any pretense of reform inside prison, which 
remained a key premise behind parole. Fortunately, parole offered an 
imperfect way to regulate the prison population. 
B.  Parole and the Regulation of Prison Populations 
Parole has typically been promoted as either a means of incentivizing 
efforts at rehabilitation by prisoners, or criticized as a mechanism that 
undermines the deterrence of the criminal law by offering the hope of 
leniency in the end. Students of prisons as organizations, however, have 
tended to see parole as a mechanism to help prisons manage population 
pressures.44 In most states, it is local officials, police, sheriffs, prosecutors, 
and judges who determine how many people will be sent to prison through 
felony convictions, and in turn, sentenced to a term in state prison. In 
contrast, prison officials have no power to refuse admission to a person 
sentenced by a court (unless they are in an emergency), but they may be 
able to influence exits from prison through parole. This is complicated by 
the fact that in most states the paroling authority had (or still has) some 
independence from the prison administration.45 Even so, the paroling 
authority is part of the same executive branch of state government, and 
subject to pressure from the chief executive to avoid the scandal that would 
ensue following a riot or escape resulting from intolerable overcrowding.46 
The most systematic effort to study parole as a regulator of state prison 
populations, was based on the research by Sheldon Messinger and his 
                                                                                                                          
42 See Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case Against 
State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 218 (2009) (contrasting the Auburn 
style prison with the harsher, less productive Pennsylvania model for penitentiaries). 
43 Id. 
44 See Peter B. Hoffman & Michael A. Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: 
Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 90 (1978) (recognizing 
the variety of governmental actors that play a role in the conviction and sentencing process). 
45 See id. at 92–93 (noting the considerable “discretion to control . . . [prisoners’] release date[s]” 
through the “parole function,” and arguing for the “creation of independent releasing authorities . . . [in 
the form of] parole boards”). 
46 See id. at 116 (highlighting that “[t]o alleviate overcrowding, a parole authority can make 
immediate but smaller changes more equally throughout the prison population”). 
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colleagues on the California prison population before 1980, and showed 
that parole release rates did increase during times of heightened 
overcrowding.47   
The other mechanism through which parole administration can 
influence prison population is administrative decisions to return to prison 
people previously released, on the basis of a parole violation (that has not 
also resulted in a new criminal conviction). In times of population 
pressure, parole authorities can use their powers to reduce the number of 
parolees returned to prison on parole violations. Research, again on 
California, has shown that it is very likely that this happened during 
Governor Ronald Reagan’s second term—when the increasing crime rate 
resulted in increasing pressure on the prison population, and the anti-tax 
Governor wanted to avoid expensive new prison construction.48 
C.  Overcrowding and the Eighth Amendment 
Despite being critical to many successful Eighth Amendment claims 
during an era of federal efforts to reform state prisons, overcrowding never 
received definitive constitutional treatment as a distinct evil, but instead 
only as part of a “totality of circumstances” that constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.49 For example, in upholding a sweeping order against 
Arkansas’ overcrowded prisons, the Supreme Court noted that crowding 
exacerbated problems like violence, and inadequate medical and dental 
care.50 Accordingly, courts were more likely to invoke “basic human 
needs” such as “food, clothing, medical care and safe and sanitary living 
conditions[,]”51 “unnecessary [or] wanton [infliction of pain,]”52 and 
“minimal measure of the necessities of civilized life.”53 
Moreover, when the Supreme Court faced two cases presenting the 
issue of overcrowding without extensive records showing these other 
conditions, the majority refused to find a constitutional violation.54 “Both 
cases make it clear that double-bunking and exceeding design capacity are 
                                                                                                                          
47 See Richard A. Berk et al., Prisons as Self Regulating Systems: A Comparison of Historical 
Patterns in California for Male and Female Offenders, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 547, 548, 573 (1983) 
(“Our argument . . . [is] that prison officials have, with an eye toward crowding, attempted to regulate 
growth, and that parole in particular has been applied to this end.”). 
48 Rosemary Gartner et al., The Past as Prologue: Decarceration in California Then and Now, 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 291, 292 (2011). 
49 Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 102.  
50 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 n.6, 684 (1978).  
51 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). For a glimpse into prisons’ recognition of 
these “basic human needs” around the time of Hutto, see NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, 
SANCTIONS, SENTENCING, AND CORRECTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 380, 382–84, 396 (1981). 
52 Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 105 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 
(1981)).  
53 Id. at 105.  
54 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979). 
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not, in and of themselves, impermissible. The minimum requirements for 
inmate housing recommended by experts and model standards are not 
mandated by the Constitution.”55 
According to Bell v. Wolfish, a case applying the Due Process Clause 
to pretrial custody in a jail setting, overcrowding only violates the 
Constitution when it causes “genuine privations and hardship over an 
extended period of time.”56 Additionally, in Rhodes v. Chapman, an Eighth 
Amendment case on a prison setting, the Court stated that overcrowding 
only became a constitutional problem when it led to “deprivations of basic 
human needs” and “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”57  
III. RHODES V. CHAPMAN: THE LOST CHANCE 
TO STOP MASS INCARCERATION 
Rhodes marks the beginning of the end for the period of expansive 
federal rights for prisoners.58 Although it left in place many precedents 
establishing overcrowding as part of unconstitutional conditions, and 
plenty of room for willing district courts to distinguish its outcome, Rhodes 
signaled a decisive shift back in the direction of the once dominant “hands 
off” rule that sub voce was said to have all but insulated state prisons from 
federal court challenges. The rhetoric of Justice Powell’s majority opinion, 
with a sneering rejection of a right to comfortable prisons, fits right in line 
with the increasingly punitive and degrading “tough on crime” rhetoric that 
was becoming firmly established in the electoral branches of the state and 
federal governments. All of this would be enough for contemporary 
reformers to see Rhodes as one of many decisions by the Supreme Court in 
the 1980s and 1990s that permitted the war on crime and ultimately mass 
incarceration to run its course. Rhodes has a particularly standout role, 
however, in mass incarceration. Put simply, an enforceable one-person, 
one-cell rule for long-term imprisonment (the kind of per se rule that the 
Court was eager to reject) would have ended mass incarceration in its 
cradle. Prison populations in the states had already been growing for nearly 
five years when Rhodes was decided.59 Stimulated in part by federal court 
orders to relieve overcrowding, states were beginning to launch prison 
construction programs that would multiply by several times the entirety of 
the prison estate that had been created up to that time. But despite the 
unprecedented wave of new prisons, most state systems remained 
                                                                                                                          
55 Angelos & Jacobs, supra note 33, at 106. 
56 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 523, 542. 
57 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339, 347. 
58 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 47–48 (1998). 
59 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS 1925–81, at 1 (1982), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf [https://perma.cc/A426-WYT7]. 
 2016] THE NEW OVERCROWDING 1203 
overcrowded throughout the prisoner boom, overwhelmed by sentencing 
laws that raised prison years faster than the states could afford to build 
prisons. Double celling would become a norm in the prison systems of 
mass incarceration. Had double celling in long-term prisons been found 
unconstitutional in 1981, states would have been compelled to undergo the 
kinds of revisions of their sentencing and parole laws now being 
undertaken. Instead, new laws were piled on in the 1990s, increasing time 
served in prison, eliminating the opportunity for parole procedures to 
address prison overcrowding, and establishing mass incarceration as a new 
kind of penal model. 
A.  The Single Cell Standard in Correctional Thought 
The single cell standard dismissed by the Supreme Court as an 
aspirational, rather than constitutionally required norm, had been embraced 
by the two leading norm-setters for United States prisons during this 
period, the American Correctional Association’s Commission on 
Accreditation for Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The 
amicus brief filed by the United States in Rhodes is devoted to calling 
attention to the then quite recently promulgated “Federal Standards for 
Prisons and Jails,” establishing “one inmate per cell or room” and further 
stating sixty square feet as the appropriate size for this type of cell.60 As the 
appended charts further showed, the federal government in the early 1980s 
was still adhering to what the amicus brief called a “firm federal policy 
that there be no double celling in long-term correctional facilities.”61 The 
Commission’s Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions 
embraced the same standards. 
In many respects the one-person, one-cell norm was a product of the 
golden age of prison sociology. Studies by sociologists like Gresham 
Sykes and Sheldon Messinger established in vivid terms the pains of 
imprisonment and the loss of the major anchor points of adult identity in 
prison.62 From this perspective, the single cell was much more than an 
issue of comfort or discomfort. Taking people already reeling from the 
degradation ceremonies surrounding incarceration, and placing them in a 
cell with another inmate—someone likely in prison because of anti-social 
behavior and attitudes—risked a “loss of dignity” and “profound attacks on 
the [prisoner’s] image or sense of personal worth.”63 
Penal experts also emphasized the danger of violence. Prisons in the 
1970s and 1980s were already undergoing profound transformation even 
                                                                                                                          
60 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (No. 80-332). 
61 Id. at 2. 
62 Brief of Respondents at 22, Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (No. 80-332). 
63 Id. at 22. 
 1204 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1191 
before the arrival of the mass incarceration generation.64 The breakdown of 
the old industrial model of prison labor placed greater strain on the inmate 
social order to address the boredom and deprivations associated with 
incarceration without the socializing benefits of the barter economy, which 
a production-oriented prison labor system allowed.65 This was considerably 
exacerbated by racial transformation, as a once overwhelmingly white 
prison population became more closely divided.66 The result was a tense 
brew of race-based prisoner organizations, some of them inspired by social 
change and revolutionary politics.67 Nor was the potential for violence 
theoretical in 1980. The Attica uprising and the massacre that followed the 
retaking of the prison highlighted the powerful tensions both uniting and 
dividing prisoners in older state prisons suffering from the older style 
prison overcrowding.68 Far from being abstract or aspirational, the district 
court in Rhodes listened to prison experts that were extremely concerned 
about the potential for violence at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(SOCF).69 After another decade of worsening overcrowding, those 
concerns were realized when prisoners’ resentment over medical care 
issues led to one of the worst riots and longest prison takeovers in 
contemporary correctional history. 
B.  The Court’s Uncomfortable Prison Standard 
The district court’s order in Rhodes, which barred the use of double 
celling at SOCF except for emergencies,70 was a clear example of the kind 
of overreach by federal courts in reforming state prisons that was 
becoming a common complaint from state and federal politicians.71 This 
would in the 1990s lead to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, formally 
limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts over state prison defendants.72 
The order amounted to a per se rule against double celling, establishing a 
single cell as an Eighth Amendment right.73 Instead of being based on 
careful fact-finding, this per se rule was imposed by the district court based 
                                                                                                                          
64 JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL (1980). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1016–17 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th 
Cir. 1980)), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
70 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
71 E.g., Wendell Rawls Jr., Judges’ Authority in Prison Reform Attacked, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/18/us/judges-authority-prison-reform-attacked-courts-trial-thi 
rd-four-articles-efforts.html [https://perma.cc/HPU6-RKSL]. 
72 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(b), 
3626 (2012), and in sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
73 Chapman, 434 F.Supp. at 1021. 
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on abstract standards taken from aspirational documents.74 From this 
perspective, the case fits into the broader backlash against judicial activism 
that was coming from the Supreme Court, and later Congress, around the 
prison issue during the 1980s and 1990s.75 In retrospect, we can also see 
that the case reflects, at best, a profound misunderstanding by the Supreme 
Court of the transformations in American penality that were producing 
mass incarceration. 
As a piece of judicial review, Rhodes is a stunning if utterly 
disingenuous piece of de novo review of facts. Cherry-picking a couple of 
phrases and facts from a tremendously rich and complicated record, the 
majority and concurrences recast the entire findings, and then 
unceremoniously found that the district court had abused its discretion by 
ignoring this new set of findings.76 The district court found SOCF a prison 
saddled with a permanent overpopulation of nearly 40% and likely to 
grow, which was overwhelming the few forms of out of cell prison activity 
available to prisoners, raising the risk of violence throughout the prison, 
and forcing a large minority of prisoners to coexist inside their cell with 
another prisoner.77 The district court found it significant that most SOCF 
prisoners were there on long terms, calling for life or a long determinate 
sentence, and that they had typically been convicted of violent crimes or 
had been transferred from other prisons due to behavior problems.78 
It was in this context of a maximum-security prison holding long-term 
prisoners with serious risks of behavior problems that the district court 
found double celling caused an unacceptable risk of “physical and mental 
injury from long term exposure.”79 As Justice Marshall wrote in his 
spirited dissent, “the facility described by the majority is not the one 
involved in this case.”80 Instead, without visiting the prison or bothering to 
reference much of the record, Justice Powell described a prison that was 
recently built and “top flight” at that.81 A place, in line with modern 
correctional goals, that included a library, gymnasiums, and classrooms.82 
The Court acknowledged the reality of double celling, but dismissed this as 
a minor problem.83 The Court seemed particularly taken with the fact that 
                                                                                                                          
74 See id. (citing the National Sheriff’s Association Handbook on Jail Architecture, the National 
Sheriff’s Association Manual on Jail Administration, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
Model Act for the Protection of the Rights of Prisoners, and the Report of the Special Civilian 
Committee for the study of the United States Army Confinement System). 
75 See generally LYNCH, supra note 5. 
76 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339–69 (1981). 
77 Id. at 343, 349 n.14. 
78 Id. at 343. 
79 Id. (citing Chapman, 434 F. Supp. at 1021). 
80 Id. at 369–70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
81 Id. at 340 (quoting Chapman, 434 F. Supp. at 1009). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 337. 
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SOCF organized its cells in the modern pod style around day rooms that 
allowed a common area for television, games, and recreational activities;84 
ignoring the fact that use of these common areas might in fact be quite high 
risk for an overcrowded and tense prison population riven along racial 
lines.85 For the Court, the absence of a proven relationship between the 
prison population rise and the rate of violence made irrelevant the district 
court’s detailed assessment of the views of experts for both sides on the 
threat of violence.86 In this light, the double celling standard amounted to a 
requirement that prisons be comfortable. Yet, even assuming the “theory 
that double celling inflicts pain,” the majority saw no constitutional 
violation.87 Instead, they were willing to stipulate that the Constitution 
does not “mandate comfortable prisons” and that prisons like SOCF 
“cannot be free of discomforts.”88 
 C.  The Rhodes to Mass Incarceration 
For distinguishing purposes, it is attractive going forward to embrace 
the Court’s dominant narrative of the case. If the district court in Rhodes 
had sinned by placing an abstract aspirational right on a record devoid of 
actual evidence of mental and physical suffering, the case left plenty of 
room for other district courts, so inclined to ignore Rhodes’ light of very 
different kinds of findings.89 In retrospect, however, Rhodes should be seen 
as significant for its deliberate effort to ignore the mounting signs that 
American penology was undergoing change. For decades, state prison 
systems had been focused officially on rehabilitation, and in some states 
departments of corrections were created after World War II to promote 
professionalization and treatment orientation.90 The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons in particular, after the harsh years of Alcatraz in the 1930s and 
1940s, became highly treatment oriented in the 1960s and 1970s with a 
model for highly modern, secure, and treatment-oriented prisons with little 
                                                                                                                          
84 Id. at 341. 
85 See, e.g., CAL. STATE AUDITOR, HIGH RISK UPDATE—PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT AND THE 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION (2015), https://www.auditor.ca. 
gov/pdfs/reports/2015-609and2015-610.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YY-WZN5]. 
86 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347–50. 
87 Id. at 348–49. 
88 Id. 
89 Indeed, Margo Schlanger’s work shows that despite Rhodes, prisoner litigation remained quite 
active until the Prison Litigation Reform Act gave rise to a sharp decline in 1995. Margo Schlanger, 
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 6, 1555–706 (2003). 
90 See, e.g., 1940–1945, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/timeline/1940-
1945.html [https://perma.cc/HQV7-47PY] (displaying the post-war founding of the Florida 
Department); Historical Timeline, TENN. DEP’T CORRECTION, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/corr 
ection/attachments/HistoricalTimeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAL7-8BH7] (indicating the bifurcation of 
two older departments post-war to form the Department of Correction). 
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overcrowding.91 The individualized orientation of punishment in these 
states, coupled with parole and the existence of a much larger public 
mental health system, also meant that those with serious mental health 
problems could be channeled out of the prison system.92 
Although only a few years into the new more punitive era, the record 
in Rhodes suggests the new elements that would come to define mass 
incarceration, including rapid population growth (the prison opened in 
1972 and was overcrowded by 1975),93 the concentration of long-term 
prisoners with declining opportunities for release,94 and the large numbers 
of prisoners who were entering with a known history of serious mental 
illness.95 The Supreme Court chose to ignore these warnings and treated 
the overcrowding problem at SOCF as a modest difficulty in the face of 
what was otherwise a “top-flight first-class facility.”96 The Court dismissed 
permanent overcrowding as irrelevant unless the record showed actual 
breakdowns in essential infrastructures or provisions like food.97 The Court 
ignored the building mental health crisis with the reassurance that there 
was “no evidence of indifference by SOCF staff to inmates’ mental or 
dental needs.”98 The only problems the Court acknowledged were in the 
dilution of programs that were arguably rehabilitative.99 To treat delays in 
delivery of rehabilitative services as cruel and unusual punishment would 
be to “wrench the Eighth Amendment from its language and its history.”100 
The case was doctrinally significant, the Court’s first occasion to 
review what was framed as a “pure conditions case,” i.e., not raising other 
evidence of abuse (like excessive use of force).101 Rights advocates and the 
liberal justices who concurred likely were relieved that the increasingly 
conservative majority had not called into question the legitimacy of this 
                                                                                                                          
91 See Historical Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/history/ 
timeline.jsp [https://perma.cc/QS4J-S25U] (stating that in 1959, “medical model” gains traction). 
92 But see DARRELL STEINBERG ET AL., STANFORD LAW SCH. THREE STRIKES PROJECT, WHEN 
DID PRISONS BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE FACILITIES? (2015), http://law.stanford. 
edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/632655/doc/slspublic/Report_v12.pdf [http://web. 
archive.org/web/20160421211538/http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-p 
age/632655/doc/slspublic/Report_v12.pdf].  
93 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 341. 
94 E.g., id. at 357 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
95 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 
1980)), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (“[A] substantial number of the inmates are victims of some form of 
emotional or mental disorder.”). 
96 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 341 (quoting Chapman, 434 F. Supp. at 1009). 
97 See id. at 342 (disputing the claim that overcrowding overwhelmed the prison by pointing to the 
quality of the prisons’ infrastructure). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 343. 
100 Id. at 348. 
101 Id. at 345. 
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class of Eighth Amendment cases,102 instead setting a seemingly higher bar 
for proof of actual harm.103 In retrospect, the case signaled a chill on 
protection of prisoner rights in state prisons just as the states were moving 
rapidly away from rehabilitation and mechanisms like parole, toward a 
system of uncontrolled growth, mass incarceration, and chronic/hyper 
overcrowding.104 Not only did the majority miss the last chance to stop 
mass incarceration in its tracks, their singular failure to recognize the 
emerging elements placed their call for greater deference to state officials 
directly in the stream of an independent shift by state officials toward 
indifference to the well-being of prisoners. Just as the federal judiciary 
needed to be alerted to an emerging threat to human dignity, the Court used 
the occasion of this particularly sharp dressing down of a federal trial judge 
to encourage those courts to stand down.  
In discharging this oversight responsibility, however, courts 
cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the 
perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the 
goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system: to 
punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned 
persons to society with an improved change of being useful, 
law-abiding citizens.105  
IV. THE NEW OVERCROWDING AS A NEW PENOLOGY 
To a striking degree, the record in Rhodes anticipates the full flowering 
of mass incarceration including: the flow of prisoners with serious mental 
problems, the permanence of overcrowding and double celling, new 
prisons that are relatively decent in terms of food, heat, and shelter, but 
which increasingly lack the ability to deliver services.106 Most importantly, 
Rhodes opened the door to chronic hyper overcrowding of the sort 
manifest in the Rhodes record but unrecognized by the Court.107   
A decade later in an article titled, The New Penology: The Emerging 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id. at 352–53 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
103 Id. at 349 (majority opinion). 
104 See David R. Cianflone, Prisons: Confinement and the Eighth Amendment: Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 3 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 363, 380 (1982) (discussing a transition away from prisoner’s 
access to the courts and towards allowing prison administrators and state legislators to handle the 
problems stemming from overcrowding in prisons). 
105 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352. 
106 See Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a Broken System: Brown v. Plata 
and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1153, 1155 (2013) (describing current 
prison conditions caused by overcrowding in California). 
107 See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348–49 (discussing the prison conditions that the district court found 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and subsequently finding them unpersuasive). 
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Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications,108 Malcolm Feeley and I 
argued that the rise of historically unprecedented prison populations was 
forcing an abandonment of traditional penological concerns with 
punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence, creating instead a new 
penology based on managing whole populations through control strategies 
aimed at risk and variable security levels of custody.109 The hardening of 
chronic hyper overcrowding embedded this new penology deep into 
contemporary correctional practice.110 The new overcrowding reshaped 
routine prison life and organization.111 A new style of post-rehabilitative 
prison aimed at maximizing the numbers of people confined with attention 
only to security.112 A new emergency style of governing prisons made 
security the only consideration and promoted ways of dealing with 
prisoners as a mass, and through collective forms of punishment like 
lockdowns, riot tactics, and special weapons.113   
A.  The New Post-Rehabilitative Prison 
The new model of imprisonment in California and other states 
removed any elements of rehabilitation from the prison experience and 
removed parole as an incentive for good behavior or a way to reduce the 
prison population.114 Instead, the singular goal of imprisonment was 
becoming incapacitation, the premise that once incarcerated, the person 
imprisoned could not commit crimes against the public safety.115 As a 
result, the new prisons that were built during the 1980s and 1990s lacked 
serious attention to health, education, or treatment; they were supersized 
containers for prisoners of various risk levels.116   
                                                                                                                          
108 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992). 
109 Id. at 450, 455. 
110 See id. at 470 (concluding that the “new penology” has contributed to increased prison 
populations). 
111 See id. (describing some of the changes to the prison system, and linking those changes to 
overcrowding). 
112 Id. at 455–57. 
113 See, e.g., Laura McFarland, Powhatan Prison on 15th Day of Lockdown, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/central-virginia/powhatan/powhatan-
today/article_4a15779a-c6ea-11e5-80d3-6bac8176d973.html [https://perma.cc/US8R-QEFM] 
(describing an extended lockdown of the Powhatan Reception and Classification Center in Virginia 
after receiving tips about smuggling within the prison); Joseph Bernstein, Why Are Prison Riots 
Declining While Prison Populations Explode?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2013/12/have-a-safe-riot/354671/ [https://perma.cc/7FBY-P7TJ] (attributing fewer 
riots in prisons to the introduction of elite security forces similar to SWAT teams that put down prison 
disorder of any kind). 
114 See SIMON, supra note 14, at 111 (describing how the goals of the California penal system 
were to separate criminals from the general population for as long as possible). 
115 Id. at 23. 
116 Id. at 5–6. 
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Unlike SOCF,117 these prisons were built with the expectation that they 
would be double celled routinely and that the infrastructure could hold 
even more prisoners without threat to basic health and safety.118 Soon, even 
the day areas that the Supreme Court had found so important as a safety 
valve in Rhodes were placed into use as large dormitories with so-called 
“bad beds”—three level bunk beds spaced inches apart in the former day 
use areas of the prison.119 In echoes of Rhodes, but this time unchallenged 
by the majority on the Supreme Court, a special three judge trial court in 
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger found that in those conditions, “inmate-on-
inmate violence is almost impossible to prevent, infectious diseases spread 
more easily, and lockdowns are sometimes the only means by which to 
maintain control.”120  
B.  Emergency Government 
The expert witnesses in Coleman-Plata testified that the super-sized 
nature of California’s prisons made them virtually impossible to manage 
through ordinary correctional methods when they were not overcrowded 
and impossible to govern without a state of emergency once they became 
chronically hyper overcrowded.121 Internally, wardens had to fall back on 
lockdowns to address frequent breakdowns in order—transforming every 
level of incarceration into the supermax-like experience of being in cell or 
bunk twenty-three hours or more a day.122     
C.  Security as a Singular Value 
What is a prison that is not concerned about security? The prisons of 
mass incarceration, designed as post-rehabilitative warehouses and driven 
through overcrowding to governing by emergency, are thrown back on 
security in a way that is all but exclusive of other values. Overcrowding 
forces all considerations other than security inside the prison to recede, as 
overtaxed managers turn from one crisis to another.123 This 
emergency/security ethos feeds back into a correctional culture among 
staff that emphasizes weapons, riot suppression, and labeling of prisoners 
                                                                                                                          
117 See Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1977)), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 
(6th Cir. 1980)), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (describing how increased prison populations forced the 
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility to double-cell inmates). 
118 SIMON, supra note 14, at 51–52. 
119 Id. at 113–14.  
120 Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 
2009) (final opinion and order, combined with Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal 
Aug. 4, 2009)). 
121 SIMON, supra note 14, at 114.  
122 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011). 
123 SIMON, supra note 14, at 120. 
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as threats without human features of vulnerabilities.124 This emergency 
ethos was replicated at the system level when the Governor himself placed 
the entire system under a state of emergency in 2006 in order to use 
extraordinary powers to move some prisoners out of state and into private 
prisons.125  
V. BROWN V. PLATA: THE BIRTH OF A 
NEW OVERCROWDING JURISPRUDENCE? 
Brown v. Plata,126 which upheld a sweeping population reduction order 
against California’s chronic hyper overcrowding after finding that relieving 
overcrowding was essential to remedying existing systemic constitutional 
violations for failure to provide adequate mental healthcare127 and failure to 
provide adequate medical care,128 casts no direct doubt on the validity of 
Rhodes v. Chapman.129 Yet a careful reading of Plata suggests that the 
Court may be prepared over time to reduce Rhodes to its facts by 
recognizing the validity of remedying overcrowding. While Rhodes v. 
Chapman is only mentioned twice in the opinion (once by the majority to 
distinguish it, and once by Justice Alito in dissent to apply it and overrule 
the lower court),130 overcrowding is mentioned more than seventy times, 
more than sixty in the majority opinion alone. A big part of the reason is 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),131 a law that reflects the post-
Rhodes ethos of mistrust of federal court interventions in state prison 
systems (one that grew directly out of state anger over overcrowding 
litigation much like Rhodes).132 Without naming overcrowding, the PLRA 
singles out prison population reduction orders for more exacting burdens. 
Since overcrowding is certain to be the mediating condition, which 
precipitates a judicial decision that a population reduction remedy is 
necessary, this part of the law is, in effect, statutory protection of state 
prison overcrowding, which provides further evidence that this 
                                                                                                                          
124 Id. at 121. 
125 Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, CA.GOV, https://www.gov.ca.gov/ 
news.php?id=4278 [https://perma.cc/BY2F-NFTG] (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). 
126 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1927. 
127 See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (“The obligation to provide 
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health care.”). 
128 See Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1091 (2010) (“The complaint alleges that the 
State has provided inmates with inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.”). 
129 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
130 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1944; id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
131 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(b), 3626 (2012), and in sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
132 LYNCH, supra note 5, at 190 (describing the state’s evolving strategy to strip prisoners of the 
power to bring lawsuits). 
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constitutional norm (or non-norm under current jurisprudence) may be of 
singular importance in ending mass incarceration. Under the PLRA, the 
three-judge court (itself a special burden requiring more judges to agree 
before a population reduction order) must make a series of findings about 
the necessity and effect order.133   
Plata is most visible in the decision in the remarkably different way 
that the majority chooses to read the record here, acknowledging many of 
the very things that the Supreme Court sneeringly dismissed in Rhodes. In 
part, this reflects the Court’s recognition that mass incarceration itself has 
changed the nature of the prison and the presumptions about state expertise 
and state democratic accountability that influenced the Rhodes decision. In 
what follows, I read Plata as a turn in the road of Supreme Court prison 
conditions precedent that could lead, not especially fast, to a reduction of 
Rhodes to its facts. 
A.  Discomfort, Torture, and Dignity 
The majority opinion in Plata reads like the opinion Justice Marshall 
might have written in Rhodes. Overcrowding is recognized to be a matter 
not of discomfort, but of disease, disability, delay in treatment, and 
resulting pain and death. The threat of violence, and the inability of 
correctional officers to offer realistic hope of rescue given the triple bunk 
“bad bed” sections of the prison is seen as a real one. Interestingly, here the 
Court does not demand statistical showings that the violence is more than 
what you would expect based on the increased population.   
One major difference is simply the scale of overcrowding. The figure 
chosen by the three-judge court in the district court decision leading up to 
Plata as the target for reducing overcrowding sufficiently to permit remedy 
of the unconstitutional conditions was 137.5%,134 the precise level of 
overcrowding recognized by the Court as not a violation in Rhodes. This is 
perhaps a coincidence, but it may also reflect the enduring precedential 
influence of Rhodes that the Court did not accept the prisoners’ argument 
for reducing overcrowding altogether. However, the record established that 
for most of the period in contestation, California had operated at more than 
200% of design capacity—and in various prisons closer to 300%.135 While 
the Supreme Court could treat some level of double celling as unlikely to 
undermine the basic decency of the correctional regime in Rhodes, the total 
uniformity of double and triple celling, as well as the “bad beds,” placed 
California in a different place. The Court in Plata seemed to signal just this 
                                                                                                                          
133 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (a)(2)(B) (2012). 
134 Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351 THE, 2010 WL 
99000, at *1 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010). 
135 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924, 1934. 
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in appending three photographs to the majority opinion, two of them 
depicting the “bad bed” sections. 
The second major difference is the super-salience of mental illness as 
well as other chronic physical illnesses and disabilities. While there was 
evidence in the Rhodes record that more prisoners were entering SOCF 
with serious mental illnesses136 the Plata case reflected a record built up 
over some twenty years of litigation on mental health,137 and nearly fifteen 
on medical care.138 The characterization of the prison population as 
severely disease-burdened139 and the continuing independent court findings 
on the failure of California to provide adequate medical care140 changed the 
nature of the overcrowding conversation. Overcrowding in these 
conditions, with this level of disease burden, truly risks tortuous suffering 
and the ever-present risk of the same. The new overcrowding, with its 
chronically ill prisoner population, creates what I have called “torture on 
the installment plan,”141 which blurs the line between discomfort and 
torture—what may be discomfort to a healthy prisoner becomes torture to 
an unhealthy one.142  
The Rhodes opinion went out of its way to minimize talk of human 
dignity and humanity under the Eighth Amendment;143 the Plata opinion 
amplified them, noting that prisoners have a right to “human dignity” that 
survives their imprisonment and which prisons must respect.144 If, as 
Justice Kennedy stated in Plata, “dignity animates the Eighth 
                                                                                                                          
136 See Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th 
Cir. 1980), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (“[A] substantial number of the inmates are victims of some 
form of mental disorder. One expert testified that in a maximum security prison of any size some 15% 
of the inmates may be expected to be schizophrenic.”). 
137 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1926 (outlining Coleman v. Brown, which commenced in the 1990s 
and involved a class of seriously mentally ill California prisoners). 
138 See id. at 1926–27 (outlining Plata v. Brown, which commenced in 2001 and involved a class 
of state prisoners with serious medical conditions). 
139 See id. at 1927 (citing a report that found overcrowding to increase the incidence of infectious 
disease in a California prison); id. at 1933 (“A medical expert described living quarters . . . where large 
numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets and showers, as ‘breeding grounds for disease.’”); id. 
at 1933 n.7 (recounting the testimony of corrections officials who described outbreaks of disease, 
including one who described widespread staph infections among prisoners, recalling that they were 
“bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when they come in to get the wound 
covered and treated”).  
140 Id. at 1922 (“This case arises from serious constitutional violations in California’s prison 
system. The violations have persisted for years. They remain uncorrected.”).  
141 SIMON, supra note 14. 
142 Id. 
143 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1981) (discussing Eighth Amendment 
analysis, noting that it prohibits punishments which “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,” but failing to mention human dignity or humanity in its analysis). 
144 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human 
dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment”). 
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Amendment,”145 it is possible that overcrowding violates the Eighth 
Amendment whenever it subjects the prisoner to experiences that ordinary 
members of the non-imprisoned society would experience as a serious 
insult to their humanity. This includes being forced to urinate and defecate 
in the direct visual and audible presence of others, being denied access to 
visits and educational opportunities in prison during prolonged lockdowns, 
or being deprived of decent facilities to clean one’s self. 
B.  Democracy and Distrust 
 Even if Plata broke no new Eighth Amendment grounds, its contrast 
with Rhodes in its approach to deference to state elected and appointed 
officials is noteworthy.146 Rhodes went out of its way to instruct trial 
judges not to “assume that state legislatures and prison officials are 
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing 
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal 
function in the criminal justice system.”147 Below, the three-judge trial 
court explicitly recognized the pathological politics of mass incarceration 
as relevant to their decision to order that the state produce a population-
reduction plan: 
Tough-on-crime politics have increased the population of 
California’s prisons dramatically while making necessary 
reforms impossible. As a result the state’s prisons have 
become places “of extreme peril to the safety of persons” 
they house, while contributing little to the safety of 
California residents.148  
While the Supreme Court did not repeat this observation, the majority 
was quick to dismiss the state’s argument that they should be trusted to 
resolve the problem. They cited the state of emergency declared by the 
then-sitting governor,149 as well as the findings of a state commission that 
overcrowding was an extreme danger,150 as indicators that the state did not 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id.  
146 Compare id. at 1928 (“Courts must be sensitive to . . . the need for deference to experienced 
and expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers 
of convicted criminals.”), with Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 361–62 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court 
and the lower courts have been especially deferential to prison authorities . . . . Courts must and do 
recognize the primacy of legislative and executive authorities in the administration of prisons; however, 
if the prison authorities do not conform to constitutional minima, the courts are under an obligation to 
take steps to remedy the violations.”). 
147 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352. 
148 Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (citations omitted). 
149 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1924 (“In 2006, then-Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of 
emergency in the prisons, as ‘immediate action is necessary to prevent death and harm caused by 
California’s severe prison overcrowding.’”). 
150 Id.  
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have the situation under control and was unable to act effectively without 
judicial intervention.151   
VI. CONCLUSION: A SINGLE CELL RULE IN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT  
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court noted that there was no “one 
man, one cell” principle “lurking” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment,152 and in Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court pointedly refused to 
recognize a constitutional right to comfortable prisons.153 If overcrowding 
was too diffuse a harm to receive constitutional protection under the 
(perhaps already imaginary) conditions of late penal welfarism in SOCF, 
then the new overcrowding, with its permanence, its hypertrophic status, 
and its operation within a prison estate built without concerns for 
rehabilitation and filled with a disease-burdened prison population proved 
to be a different circumstance. The line between discomfort and torture 
simply cannot be drawn under such conditions.   
There are many sound public policy arguments to support this, as there 
were in 1981 when the Supreme Court rejected the views of the 
Department of Justice and the American Correctional Association.154 
Today, we know much more about the perverse consequences of degrading 
conditions on future compliance with the law.155 The new overcrowding 
assures that degrading treatment is a routine feature of imprisonment in 
America, a factor that may explain why our recidivism rates are roughly 
twice what they were in the 1970s.156 But even if policymakers should 
continue to believe that crude incapacitation is the best value they can 
obtain from prisons, they must still operate them in a way that preserves 
essential human dignity. A fair and balanced look at the evidence today 
about what prison life is like in the warehouse prisons of mass 
                                                                                                                          
151 See id. at 1923 (noting that although the conditions of California prisons have “fallen short of 
minimum constitutional requirements” for years, judicial intervention was appropriate because no 
remedy had proven sufficient). 
152 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979). 
153 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
154 See id. at 356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the Justice Department, among other 
authorities, recommended sixty square feet of space per prisoner as the minimal acceptable standard); 
id. at 343 n.7 (majority opinion) (noting that the trial court accepted contemporary studies regarding 
living quarters space in correctional institutions, including one by the American Correctional 
Association that recommended a minimum of sixty square feet). 
155 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 14 (2002) (“[D]eference develops . . . when people are 
treated fairly by legal authorities, and people’s willingness to consent and cooperate with legal 
authorities is rooted in their judgments about the degree to which those authorities are using fair 
procedures.”).  
156 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1850–1984 (1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcsus5084.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7J8-NGLQ]; 
Reentry Trends in the U.S., BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/recidivism.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/VJ5B-URYN].  
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incarceration suggests that conserving dignity requires a room of one’s 
own. 
